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Abstract 
This paper studies the risk profile and capital adequacy of hedge funds by 
extending the sample period used in the research of Gupta and Liang (2005). We apply a 
VaR-based approach to evaluate over 6,000 hedge funds from the Lipper Tass Academic 
Hedge Fund Database, including live funds and graveyard funds, and find that only a 
small percentage of them are undercapitalized as of September 2014. By conducting a 
cross-sectional regression of fund capitalization on various characteristics of hedge funds, 
we reach a conclusion that whether a hedge fund is adequately capitalized is related to its 
age and investment style. Standard deviation and leverage ratio often underestimate the 
market risk hedge funds face, whereas VaR-based measures successfully capture both 
static and dynamic risk profile of hedge funds. 
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1: Introduction 
Hedge fund industry, one of the fastest growing sectors in the financial service 
industry, has been attracting high net-worth and major institutional investors such as 
large pension funds and university endowments due to its distinctive characteristics. With 
a rapid rate of growth, the hedge fund industry also attracts attention of academics. They 
have analysed the performance of hedge funds from different perspectives and implied 
the necessity of further researches on hedge funds’ capital adequacy. 
In 2000, Fung and Hsieh used a mean-variance approach to study hedge fund 
exposures in some major market events. They analysed hedge fund performance during 
turbulent market times. But due to limitations of their research methodology, they found 
no obvious evidence that hedge funds would cause market prices to deviate from 
economic fundamentals.  
Jorion (2000) is the first one to extend the analysis on hedge fund performance 
from a mean-variance approach to the VaR approach. He analysed the failure of Long-
term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 and discovered that LTCM’s failure is due to 
its strategy of maximizing expected returns conditional on a constraint of VaR, which 
causes a substantial amount of leverage and high sensitivity to uncertainty in asset 
correlations. This research also demonstrated the fact that VaR is an applicable method to 
illustrate the risk characteristics of investment vehicles. 
Alexander and Baptisata (2003) further developed a VaR-based measure of 
portfolio performance called the reward-to-VaR ratio, which is closely related to Sharpe 
ratio. They showed that under the assumption of normal portfolio returns, reward-to-VaR 
ratio and Sharpe ratio give the same ranking of portfolio performance. While under non-
normality, the rankings are different. Agarwal (2004) reached important conclusions that 
some hedge fund strategies have payoffs similar to “a short position in a put option on the 
market index”, and a traditional mean-variance framework tends to ignore this risk. Using 
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mean-conditional VaR framework, Agarwal examined the extent to which the mean-
variance approach underestimates the left tail risk.  
Though the analysis on risk characteristics of hedge funds has a huge impact on 
hedge fund managers and market participants, very few studies related to capital 
adequacy of hedge funds have been done. Gupta and Liang’s (2005) paper is “the first 
one to address capital adequacy and risk estimation issues in the entire hedge fund 
industry”. They used the VaR approach to study capital requirements for almost 1500 
hedge funds and found that only a small amount of funds are undercapitalized as of 
March 2003. Del Brio, Monra-Valencia and Perote (2014) further compared the 
performance of risk measures using three approaches: parametric distributions, semi-
nonparametric methodologies and the extreme value theory approach. They showed that 
the extreme value theory approach accurately forecast hedge fund VaR.  
From the implication of the papers discussed above, we use a VaR-based extreme 
value theory approach to analyze the non-normal distribution of hedge fund returns and 
focus on the associated left tail risk. We base our research on Gupta and Liang’s paper 
(2005) and extend the sample period to September 2014. Our aim here is to provide an 
update on hedge fund capital adequacy and examine whether the recent financial crisis 
has made a significant impact on it. Since hedge funds managers adjust their portfolios 
quite frequently and market conditions are dynamic, we also look at time variation of 
hedge fund capital adequacy using rolling windows. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section is literature 
review, Section 3 gives an overview of VaR. Section 4 introduces the data, followed by 
our research methodology in Section 5. Section 6 describes the results, and Section 7 tests 
the robustness of our approach. We conclude in Section 6.  
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2: Literature Review 
In this section, we will review some preceding literatures that have contributed to 
the development of hedge fund. These literatures analyze the characteristics of hedge 
fund industry and provide comprehensive evaluation from different perspectives.  
Fung and Hsieh (1997) first found that hedge funds follow dynamic trading 
strategies that are totally different from mutual funds, and they clarified five main 
investment styles used in hedge funds. This clarification provided a basic framework for 
any further analysis on hedge fund investment styles. For example, Fung, Hsieh, Naik 
and Ramadorai (2008) performed an investigation on the risk characteristics and capital 
formation of hedge fund industry with a special focus on the investment style of funds-of-
funds. 
Ackermann et al. (1999) conducted a comparison between hedge funds and other 
traditional investment vehicles, such as mutual funds. He discovered that although hedge 
funds are more volatile than both mutual funds and standard market indices, they usually 
perform better than mutual funds. Liang (1999) found similar results that hedge funds 
could adapt to more complex trading strategies and possess lower systematic risk than 
mutual funds. Hedge funds usually provide higher Sharpe ratios than mutual funds 
although their returns tend to have higher volatility. Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011) 
discovered that hedge fund leverage is mostly influenced by economy-wide factors, and 
there is an obvious relationship between the volatility of hedge fund returns and leverage 
ratios. They found that a decrease in the volatility of hedge fund returns would predict a 
future increase in fund leverage. 
Agarwal and Naik (2004) used mean-variance value-at-risk method to illustrate 
that previous mean-variance analysis on hedge funds had underestimated the tail risk of 
hedge funds. Hedge funds present significant left-tail risk. Buraschi, Kosowski and 
Trojani (2013) contributed to the risk-return profile of hedge funds by exploring a 
nonlinear relation between correlation risk exposure and the tail risk of hedge fund 
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returns. Lhabitant (2001) developed a model of VaR to measure the risk figures of hedge 
funds, but he did not take all the risk components of hedge funds into consideration, such 
as credit risks and liquidity risks. George O. Aragon (2007) found that hedge funds with 
lockup restrictions have higher excess returns than those without them. These restrictions 
allow hedge funds to manage illiquid assets more efficiently. Sadka (2010) discovered 
that liquidity risk is an important determinant in the cross-sectional hedge-fund returns, 
and systematic liquidity risk should be analysed properly among all hedge fund risks.  
Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2012) analysed different risk factors, such as market 
risk, tail risk and systematic risk, and found that systematic risk is the key determinant for  
cross-sectional differences in hedge fund returns. They conducted further estimations in 
2014 on macroeconomic risk of hedge funds and concluded macroeconomic risk also 
plays an important role in explaining the cross-sectional difference in hedge fund returns. 
The macroeconomic risk is interpreted as a measure of economic uncertainty. 
Liu and Mello (2011) investigated the fragile nature and limited arbitrage 
capabilities of hedge fund capital structure in time of financial crisis and found 
correlations between hedge fund performance and financial market fluctuations. Bali, 
Brown and Caglayan (2011) conducted forecasts and found a significant link between 
hedge fund default premium and future returns by studying on hedge fund exposures to 
various financial and macroeconomic risk factors. 
The papers discussed above inspire us to employ a value-at-risk method on the 
risk profile, especially tail risk of hedge funds across investment styles. We also conduct 
further investigation on the relationship between hedge fund risk, capital adequacy and 
proceeding influential factors such as fund size, age, and leverage ratios.  
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3: Defining Value-at-Risk 
VaR estimates the worst loss in value terms that can occur over defined period of 
time for a given confidence interval. For example, 10-day VaR of $1 million on an asset 
with a confidence interval of 95% indicates that the probability of the value of the asset 
dropping $1 million within any given ten days is 5%. VaR is widely used by financial 
institutions to measure the potential loss of their portfolios over a target horizon. Banks 
are required to hold reserves so that they are able to fulfil unexpected withdrawals. 
Similarly, it is important for hedge funds to hold enough capital in case of unexpected 
market movements.  Consequently, we could evaluate whether a hedge fund is 
appropriately capitalized by comparing its assets to required capital (which is a multiple 
of VaR). 
VaR is widely used in many financial areas as a method to quantify risk and set 
regulatory capital requirements. Back in 1980, Securities and Exchange Committee 
started to require financial institutions and firms to hold capital equal to a potential loss 
over one-month interval with 95% confidence (Lovelady, 2013). The potential losses 
were usually computed using historical returns. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) stimulated the use of VaR in financial industry by recommending 
banks to use VaR to measure market risk. Later in Basel III, BCBS also allowed banks to 
use their internal VaR models to calculate their own capital requirement for market risk 
provided that the model is approved by the bank’s supervisor (BIS, 2011). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to examine capital adequacy of hedge funds using the VaR measure. 
There are two main components in VaR – a time period and a confidence level. 
The choices of these two variables are arbitrary. As the length of time period increases, 
VaR becomes larger.  The confidence level is usually quite high so that the capital 
requirement is high enough to cover investment loss. Generally, the capital requirement 
for commercial banks is three (a supervisory multiplier) times the market risk VaR, 
which is calculated using 10-day period with a 99% confidence level. However, 
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supervisor of the bank is entitled to increase the multiplier if there is poor backtesing 
performance. In this paper, we compute the required capital for hedge funds as three 
times the 99% one-month VaR. Compared to banks, hedge funds are less regulated and 
they are not capable of using public funding. Therefore, hedge funds are not able to react 
to unexpected market movements as quickly as banks. This fact is reflected with the 
choice of one-month horizon. 
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4: Data 
Hedge funds consist of portfolios, and the portfolios are usually comprised with 
non-linear assets such as options and derivatives. Thus the returns of hedge funds should 
automatically reflect some features of the returns on non-linear assets. They should have 
option-like features that are non-Gaussian. Previous researches imply that VaR are 
traditionally used in situations where there is a linear relationship between portfolio 
returns and their corresponding underlying risk factors. When we employ the VaR 
approach here, it becomes a more complex task due to the hedge funds’ non-linear 
features.  
The dataset we use in our analysis is from the Lipper Tass Academic Hedge Fund 
Database. It is one of the oldest hedge fund available, which provides detailed 
performance information about live funds and graveyard funds including monthly returns 
from their start date to now. The performance record’s start dates for some of the early 
live funds can go back to as far as February 1977 and the performance record’s start dates 
for some of the early dead funds are in July 1978. As of September 2014, the dataset 
includes monthly returns for 5894 live funds and 13793 graveyard funds.  
We employ a minimum performance record period of seven years in the return 
history of each hedge fund for calculations of VaR. Those funds with a performance 
record period less than seven years are not taken into consideration. The reason for doing 
this is to make sure that the hedge fund we are going to analyze experiences at least one 
economic downturn in its life span. By selecting the hedge funds whose return periods 
have covered the most turbulent times in the financial history in our dataset, we can reach 
a more realistic conclusion compared to using the dataset directly without any 
manipulation. For example, the most recent financial collapse is the Financial Crisis of 
2007-2008, and our most updated hedge fund performance information covers the returns 
of hedge funds till September 2014. This selection process in the live funds’ dataset may 
introduce survivorship bias by eliminating younger funds and underestimating the extent 
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to which the funds are undercapitalized. However, our consideration of graveyard funds 
helps fix this problem because those funds have not survived. By studying both live 
hedge funds and graveyard hedge funds, we can understand the difference in the worst 
loss between these two groups. This comparison will also help us improve our evaluation 
results. Under the condition of a minimum of seven-years return history, eligible number 
of live funds and graveyard funds is 2747 and 3394 respectively. Our further analysis is 
based on the performance information of these 2747 live hedge funds and 3394 graveyard 
hedge funds. 
When we analyze the capital adequacy of hedge funds, we classify them in 
accordance with their investment styles defined by the Lipper Database. There are 
thirteen investment styles in total. To be specific, there are 27 live and 81 dead 
convertible arbitrage funds, 138 live and 165 dead emerging markets funds. Fund of 
funds style is adopted the most by both live funds (1122) and dead funds (1277) among 
thirteen styles, while option-strategy style has the least amount of funds in both live fund 
category (1) and dead fund category (13) among all styles. 
We also obtain detailed data on fund characteristics from the database, such as 
leverage ratio, management fee, and lockup periods. These data are used later in the 
paper when we look into the determinants of capital adequacy. 
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5: Research Methodology 
As we have mentioned that we use VaR to measure a threshold for losses on 
hedge funds over a given time horizon. This threshold value illustrates the amount of 
capital that a hedge fund manager should reserve in case of fund performance failure 
during the targeted period of time. We focus on the 99-percentile return in the left tail of 
the hedge funds’ return distributions when estimating VaR. Extreme Value Theory (EVT) 
is used to deal with the extreme deviations in hedge funds return distribution. By 
emphasizing on the potential effect of extreme events in the financial markets, we can 
control the loss in a more efficient way. There are two approaches to implement the EVT 
models, “fitting one of the three standard extreme value distributions to block maxima 
values in a time series”, Frechet, Weibull or Gumbel (Gupta & Liang, 2005), and a 
generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) that models the distribution of data exceeding a 
certain threshold. We use the GPD approach since it is more appropriate to use when 
there is not a large amount of data (Pickands, 1975). We estimate the parameters, tail 
index ξ and scale parameter σ, which we need for the calculations of the 99-percentile 
return in the left tail by using maximum likelihood methods. After that, we substitute the 
tail the tail index and scale parameter into the following formula from Gupata and 
Liang’s (2005):  
R99% = μ + 
σ
ξ
[(
𝑁
𝑛
𝑝)
−ξ
− 1], for ξ ≠ 0,                                            (1) 
                   R99% = μ + σ log (
𝑛
𝑁
𝑝), for ξ = 0.                                                   (2) 
VaR is then estimated as follows: 
VaR = (0 - R99%) × TA,                                                         (3) 
where VaR is value-at-risk over a month at 99% confidence interval, R99% is the 99-
percentile return calculated using EVT, and TA is the total asset of each fund. 
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The VaR we achieve from the estimation process is related to a zero return. As it 
is shown in formula (3), we use the difference between 0 and R99% instead of the 
difference between the mean return and R99%. The reason we use a zero return instead of 
a mean return is that there would be biases and errors when we calculate the mean return 
as a standard rate of return for a hedge fund. For a fund manager, the mean of the fund’s 
serial of returns may not be his expectation for the fund. Another reason is that we need 
to pay attention to the absolute dollar loss that an extreme event can cause rather than the 
relative dollar loss that is usually compared to an expected rate of return. By using the 
zero return as a benchmark, we can introduce the value of equity capital that stands for 
the capital reserve we need to keep in case of unexpected financial risks. 
To evaluate the capital adequacy of hedge funds, we introduce the capitalization 
ratio, which is used to measure whether a hedge fund is undercapitalized. It is also for 
future efficiency to analyze the hedge funds by the classification of whether they are 
undercapitalized or not. The formula for capitalization ratio is as follows: 
Cap = 
𝐸actual −𝐸required 
𝐸required 
,                                                    (4) 
where Eactual is the actual assets that a hedge fund possesses, and Erequired is the required 
capital that a hedge fund should keep to avoid an absolute loss over the corresponding 
given period of time. Erequired is calculated as three times VaR, as suggested by the 
Basel Committee.  
A negative Cap ratio indicates the undercapitalization of a hedge fund. If the Cap 
ratio is negative, it means the actual assets that a hedge fund possesses are smaller than 
the amounts that the hedge fund manager should keep. Thus we can tell whether a hedge 
fund has enough capital by referring directly to its Cap ratio. By increasing the amount of 
capital reserve according to the value of its Cap ratio, a hedge fund may reduce chances 
of failure in the long run. 
We also estimate tail conditional loss (TCL), which can be used to assess the 
capital adequacy of a hedge fund from other perspectives. TCL is a useful risk measure 
tool in financial risk assessment. It measures the average expected amount of loss that 
would happen to a hedge fund during a given period of time if the loss exceeds a specific 
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quantile, which is VaR in our context (Necir, Rassoul & Zitikis, 2010). The good thing 
about introducing TCL is that it could make up the shortfall of VaR. Although VaR could 
only imply the minimum loss that could happen to the hedge fund during 1% of the given 
period of time, the estimation of TCL could show us the average amount of loss that 
would probably happen. The formula for TCL is as follows (Gupta & Liang, 2005):  
TCL = (0 − 𝐸[𝑅|𝑅 < 𝑅99%])  ×  𝑇𝑁𝐴,                                   (5) 
where is 𝐸[𝑅|𝑅 < 𝑅99%] is the expected loss in the tail of a hedge fund return 
distribution. It is calculated as follows (Kellezi & Gilli, 2000): 
E[𝑅|𝑅 < 𝑅99%] =  
𝑅99%
1−𝜉
 + 
𝜎− 𝜉𝜇
1−𝜉
.                                        (6) 
Besides the average amount of loss that could probably happen to the hedge 
funds, TCL could also be combined with the 99% VaR to give further insights on the 
capital adequacy of hedge funds. For example, the ratio between the value of TCL and 
the corresponding VaR of a hedge fund helps identify whether the multiplier three we 
used in the calculation of the required capital is appropriate. If none of the ratio of 
TCL/VaR for the hedge funds is larger than three, then three is an appropriate multiplier 
to use. If not, then we will have to adjust the multiplier for more adequate values. We will 
give further explanation on the multiplier in Table 7.  
Most of the risk related researches on hedge funds tend to assume their return 
distributions as normal distributions, while in reality the return distributions of hedge 
funds are not normal. This difference in measure premises leads to an error between the 
VaR evaluated from the EVT approach and that estimated under the assumption of 
normal distribution. To see the difference between these two methods, we re-calculate the 
99% VaR of the hedge fund returns following the assumption of normal distribution. The 
formula for the 99% VaR under normal distribution is as follows: 
VaR = [(-2.58 × σR) × TA],                                             (7) 
where σR is the standard deviation of the returns of a hedge fund and TA is the total asset 
of each fund.  
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We re-compute Cap ratio using the same formula (4) with the new VaR and use it 
to determine whether the hedge funds have enough capital. The Cap ratios calculated 
under the assumption of normality are quite different from those calculated using ECT. 
This difference reflects an error that lies in the assumption of normal distribution of 
hedge fund returns. We will talk about this in details in the following section. 
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6: Results 
6.1 The capital adequacy of hedge funds 
Tables 1 demonstrates the characteristics of hedge funds grouped in style. All of 
the reported data are medians of funds adopting the same style. We can see that both live 
and dead funds exhibit different distributions in terms of mean, standard deviation, 
median, skewness and kurtosis across styles, therefore it is more intuitive to study these 
funds by style rather than looking at them as a whole. Live funds have a slight higher 
average monthly median return (0.60%) than dead funds (0.57%). In addition, a median 
live fund is less volatile with a standard deviation of 2.36, smaller than a median dead 
fund with a standard deviation of 2.64. These results support Liang’s (2000) finding that 
poor performance is the major contributor to a fund’s death. Almost all the funds are 
slightly negatively skewed, except both live and dead global macro and managed funds 
style, as well as dead dedicated short bias funds. The negative skewness implies that 
investors have a greater possibility of making extreme losses in general. Moreover, all 
funds exhibit kurtosis higher than three. In particular, live convertible arbitrage and other 
style funds have high median kurtosis of 12.14 and 10.38. Option-strategy and other style 
dead funds have median kurtosis of 13.00 and 12.76. These results are consistent with 
Gupta and Liang (2005) and they indicate that the distribution of hedge funds has fatter 
tails and more extreme outcomes compared to normal distribution. Therefore, instead of 
assuming normal distribution for calculating VaR, we estimate VaR using an extreme 
value theory approach. 
Table 2 presents fund assets and values of VaR calculated using the EVT 
approach as we mentioned in the previous section. The mean and median values for both 
variables are classified into fund investment styles. Fund assets indicate the size of a 
hedge fund. As of September 2014, for live funds, global macro funds have the largest 
amount of assets ($1265.7 million), while dedicated short bias funds have the smallest 
amount of asset ($16.8 million). There is also a huge discrepancy between live global 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for hedge fund returns 
 
 
 
Style Live funds 
 
Dead funds 
 
No. Mean Std.dev. Median Skew Kurt 
 
No. Mean Std.dev. Median Skew Kurt 
Convertible arbitrage 27 0.67 2.82 0.67 -1.08 12.14 
 
81 0.62 2.04 0.78 -0.60 7.13 
Dedicated short bias 3 0.27 4.22 0.71 -1.25 6.34 
 
23 0.28 6.30 0.00 0.37 5.25 
Emerging markets 138 0.95 5.68 0.91 -0.22 6.87 
 
165 0.86 5.40 0.88 -0.17 7.08 
Market neutral 62 0.57 2.51 0.56 -0.53 6.28 
 
116 0.49 2.32 0.54 -0.03 5.83 
Event driven 106 0.76 2.63 0.80 -0.66 8.02 
 
220 0.75 2.06 0.84 -0.59 7.06 
Fixed income arbitrage 54 0.82 0.99 0.83 -0.28 8.44 
 
106 0.65 1.97 0.73 -0.62 7.15 
Fund of funds 1122 0.36 1.81 0.54 -0.82 6.33 
 
1277 0.33 1.86 0.49 -0.84 6.74 
Global macro 81 0.82 3.47 0.59 0.45 5.10 
 
110 0.74 4.06 0.59 0.32 4.70 
Long/short equity hedge 574 0.74 3.63 0.77 -0.12 5.40 
 
785 0.86 4.03 0.80 0.00 5.49 
Managed futures 174 0.72 4.31 0.47 0.29 3.96 
 
242 0.67 5.21 0.43 0.28 4.52 
Multi-strategy 340 0.85 1.48 0.86 -0.42 6.42 
 
220 0.69 2.15 0.72 -0.44 6.31 
Option-strategy 1 0.83 3.94 1.11 -0.68 8.07 
 
13 0.49 2.47 0.52 -0.66 13.00 
Other 65 0.69 2.47 0.79 -0.54 10.38 
 
36 0.49 2.20 0.63 -1.03 12.76 
              Total 2747 0.60 2.36 0.68 -0.43 6.11 
 
3394 0.57 2.64 0.61 -0.30 6.09 
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Table 2: Hedge fund VaR based on Extreme Value Theory 
Fund assets and EVT VaR are in millions of dollars. 
 
 
Style Live funds 
 
Dead funds 
 
No. Fund assets 
 
EVT VAR 
 
No. Fund assets 
 
EVT VAR 
  
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
  
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
Convertible arbitrage 27 265.7 149.1 
 
41.4 27.7 
 
81 258.1 31.1 
 
29.9 3.8 
Dedicated short bias 3 16.8 16.8 
 
3.6 3.6 
 
23 112.9 24.8 
 
33.5 7.1 
Emerging markets 138 228.5 33.0 
 
63.9 15.6 
 
165 96.6 18.5 
 
11.8 2.5 
Market neutral 62 83.9 23.3 
 
8.4 4.0 
 
116 485.5 41.2 
 
65.9 6.5 
Event driven 106 311.5 100.9 
 
76.8 15.3 
 
220 64.0 18.0 
 
5.9 2.0 
Fixed income arbitrage 54 348.7 46.6 
 
40.7 1.6 
 
106 185.7 23.4 
 
63.4 8.1 
Fund of funds 1122 118.5 19.7 
 
13.1 1.9 
 
1277 171.7 12.3 
 
53.5 3.6 
Global macro 81 1265.7 58.4 
 
307.6 13.0 
 
110 174.7 32.9 
 
19.5 3.9 
Long/short equity hedge 574 127.1 43.3 
 
28.8 9.8 
 
785 154.7 13.7 
 
27.9 2.5 
Managed futures 174 169.2 37.2 
 
40.2 7.4 
 
242 128.1 4.6 
 
39.3 1.4 
Multi-strategy 340 180.1 13.6 
 
25.9 0.6 
 
220 40.3 13.7 
 
20.2 4.5 
Option-strategy 1 170.0 170.0 
 
52.5 52.5 
 
13 305.7 42.4 
 
37.6 7.2 
Other 65 378.6 73.8 
 
44.6 13.1 
 
36 43.9 11.0 
 
7.9 1.9 
              Total 2747 190.4 26.4 
 
33.8 3.4 
 
3394 146.9 21.0 
 
29.5 3.7 
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macro funds and live dedicated short bias funds in terms of absolute VaR, which ranges 
from $3.6 million dollars to $307.6 million. In the dead funds group, a similar conclusion 
can be drawn. While market neutral funds have the highest asset value of $485.5 million, 
the multi-strategy funds have the smallest asset of $40.3 million. The corresponding 
absolute VaR ranges from $65.9 million to $5.9 million. In contrast with Gupta and 
Liang (2005), the number of dead funds exceeds the number of live funds as of 
September 2014. A substantial amount of funds entered the graveyard database since they 
did not survive the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, since March 2003, the 
average fund assets of live funds decreased slightly from $198.9 million to $190.4 
million; however, an average dead fund asset increased from $48.1 million to $146.9 
million. The huge increase in dead fund assets can be explained by the fact that some 
funds that recently enter the graveyard have large assets. We then do a comparison 
between live and dead funds as of September 2014 from two aspects. Firstly, live funds 
are larger than dead funds. This result is consistent with Gupta and Liang (2005), and it is 
also consistent with Liang’s finding in 2000 that poor performance is a main contributor 
to fund death. Since dead funds tend to perform worse than live funds, dead funds lose 
more capital than live funds. Secondly, funds with certain styles, including dedicated 
short biases, emerging markets, market neutral and event drive, tend to have a great 
difference in absolute VaR between live funds and dead funds. For example, the mean 
(median) of live EVT VaR for dedicated short bias is $3.6 million ($3.6 million) and the 
corresponding value in the dead funds part is $33.5 million ($7.1 million). The reason for 
this phenomenon is that funds adopting a certain style with high EVT VaR values are 
more likely die. Those with lower absolute VaR have higher probability of survival.  
We then examine whether hedge funds have enough equity to cover the risk of 
their portfolio and organize the results by investment styles in Table 3. As mentioned in 
Section 4, a negative Cap ratio indicates fund undercapitalization. Similar to Gupta and 
Liang (2005), only a small percentage of the funds are undercapitalized, 8.1% for live 
funds and 12.3% for dead funds. For live funds, the emerging markets funds and 
managed futures funds are particularly undercapitalized with 30.4% and 19.0% 
undercapitalized funds, respectively. For dead funds, dedicated short bias funds (39.1%),
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Table 3: Undercapitalization based on VaR from EVT 
 
 
 
Style Live funds 
 
Dead funds 
 
Total funds No. U-cap % U-cap Cap ratio 
 
Total funds No. U-cap % U cap Cap ratio 
    
Mean Median 
    
Mean Median 
Convertible arbitrage 27 2 7.4 0.8 0.8 
 
81 4 4.9 10.5 9.5 
Dedicated short bias 3 0 0.0 0.5 0.5 
 
23 9 39.1 3.1 2.4 
Emerging markets 138 42 30.4 0.6 0.0 
 
165 54 32.7 9.9 9.3 
Market neutral 62 1 1.6 2.4 1.8 
 
116 2 1.7 8.5 6.2 
Event driven 106 12 11.3 1.3 1.0 
 
220 7 3.2 8.1 6.9 
Fixed income arbitrage 54 1 1.9 8.3 5.9 
 
106 2 1.9 3.2 1.9 
Fund of funds 1122 27 2.4 3.5 2.4 
 
1277 33 2.6 3.8 2.7 
Global macro 81 12 14.8 2.4 0.6 
 
110 18 16.4 13.0 11.7 
Long/short equity 574 82 14.3 0.7 0.3 
 
785 196 25.0 10.2 8.0 
Managed futures 174 33 19.0 1.8 0.3 
 
242 80 33.1 3.0 2.1 
Multi-strategy 340 5 1.5 7.9 6.4 
 
220 9 4.1 1.8 1.4 
Option-strategy 1 0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
 
13 1 7.7 11.2 7.4 
Other 65 5 7.7 3.0 1.8 
 
36 1 2.8 6.2 5.1 
            Total 2747 222 8.1 3.5 1.8 3394 416 12.3 1.6 0.9 
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emerging markets funds (32.7%), long/short equity hedge funds (25.0%) and managed 
futures funds (33.1%) all exhibit high levels of undercapitalization. The median and mean 
Cap ratio of live funds (3.5, 1.8) are both higher than those of dead funds (1.6, 0.9), 
implying that live funds are better capitalized than dead funds. These results are 
consistent with Gupta and Liang (2005), and support the proposition that hedge funds fail 
due to undercapitalization. However, since 87.7% of the dead funds are properly 
capitalized before the end of their performance date, undercapitalization is not necessarily 
the main reason for fund disappearance. Other factors, such as poor performance, needs 
to be considered when studying the death of hedge funds. 
6.2 Determinants of the Cap ratio and importance of EVT approach 
Since whether a fund is undercapitalized plays an important role in determining 
its performance, we take a further look into some characteristics that potentially have an 
impact on capital of hedge funds. A comparison of these characteristics between 
adequately capitalized funds and undercapitalized funds is listed in Table 4. By doing this 
comparison, we can determine the key factors that would usually influence capitalization 
of a hedge fund. Table 4 also illustrates the comparative characteristics between live and 
dead hedge funds. Some interesting points are as follows. First, the average asset of the 
undercapitalized live funds is $88.4 million and the corresponding value for the 
capitalized funds is $206.1 million. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Gupta and Liang (2005) do not find a significant difference between the capitalized 
and undercapitalized funds for the dead fund group. In contrast, we find a statistically 
significant difference at the 5% level with average asset of $103.5 million for the 
undercapitalized dead funds and $200.8 million for the capitalized funds. These results 
indicate that fund size does have an impact on hedge fund capitalization. Secondly, 
similar to Gupta and Liang, while the Cap ratios of adequately capitalized hedge funds 
are positive for both live and dead funds, the average Cap ratio of both live and dead 
undercapitalized funds category is -0.3%, implying on average only 70% of the 
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Table 4: Comparative characteristics of undercapitalized funds
 
 
Variable Live funds   Dead funds 
 
Adequate-cap Under-cap t-Stat 
 
Adequate-cap Under-cap t-Stat 
  Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.     Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.   
Asset ($m) 206.1 987.6 88.4 179.2 -9.9*** 
 
200.8 805.4 103.5 320.6 2.4** 
Cap ratio 4.0 4.9 -0.3 0.2 -8.9*** 2.2 3.2 -0.3 0.2 15.7*** 
Mean return 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.7 -15.5***  0.6 1.5 1.2 1.1 -7.2*** 
Median return 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.8 -6.6***  0.6 0.5 1.0 0.9 -12.3*** 
Std.dev 2.9 4.8 8.1 4.4 1.6 
 
3.2 13.3 8.0 3.4 -7.3*** 
Skewness -0.6 1.8 0.2 1.4 -7.0*** 
 
-0.6 2.0 0.3 1.2 -9.1*** 
Kurtosis 10.1 15.7 8.4 9.4 13.1*** 
 
10.9 14.5 7.9 7.8 4.2*** 
Age(months) 137.1 48.2 161.7 68.5 -3*** 
 
126.3 40.1 147.3 51.4 -9.6*** 
Leverage ratio 36.3 125.8 23.4 58.7 1.8* 
 
47.6 198.4 35.9 87.9 1.1 
Max leverage raio 83.6 194.5 64.6 120.1 1.3 
 
91.8 295.0 68.2 145.9 1.53 
Management fee 1.4 0.7 1.5 0.7 1.3 
 
1.4 0.7 1.6 1.1 -5.2*** 
Incentive fee 12.4 8.8 17.4 6.6 -2.7*** 
 
13.2 8.4 17.5 6.9 -9.8*** 
Leverage dummy 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 -2.6*** 
 
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 -6.0*** 
Watermark dummy 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 -0.1 
 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.0** 
Lockup period(months) 2.0 5.9 3.1 6.0 -8.2*** 
 
2.1 5.7 3.5 6.6 -4.6*** 
Minimum investment($m) 1.1 6.5 1.1 6.9 -5.6*** 
 
9.6 205.5 3.0 49.6 0.6 
Open-end fund dummy 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 -3.6*** 
 
0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 -2.1** 
Open-to-public dummy 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 
 
0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 -1 
Derivatives trading dummy 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 -5.3***  0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.9 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
           **Significant at the 5% level. 
           *Significant at the 10% level. 
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required capital is satisfied. Thirdly, although Gupta and Liang (2005) does not find a 
significant difference in age between the adequately capitalized and undercapitalized 
funds, we find that age of adequately capitalized funds is statistically smaller than age of 
undercapitalized funds at the 1% level for both live and dead funds. Lastly, we could not 
tell a significant difference between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized funds in 
terms of maximum leverage ratio and open-to-public dummy. Based on these results, our 
next step in the analysis is to further examine the quantitative effect of these 
characteristics on fund capitalization.  
Table 5 demonstrates the cross-sectional regression results of fund capitalization 
on various characteristics as of September 2014. We also include the investment style of 
each fund as an independent variable to test if there is any relationship between fund 
capitalization and investment styles. Specifically, the regression equation is (Gupta and 
Liang, 2005): 
Log(Capi) = α0 + α1log(sizei) + α2log(agei) + α3(mgmtfeei) + α4(incfeei) + α5(leveragei) 
   + α6(watermarki) + α7(lockupi) + ∑ 𝛽11𝑗=1 j(dummyij), 
where log(Cap) is used as a proxy for fund capitalization, and dummyj represents 11 style 
dummy variables. 
To minimize the potential evaluation error, we construct five models consisting of 
five different sets of variables, which are the same models used by Gupta and Liang 
(2005). P-values are shown in the parentheses below each parameter. We have several 
interesting findings from this table. First, fund size is not significantly correlated with 
Cap ratio in any of the five models. This is surprising to us given the significant 
difference in fund size between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized funds as we 
find in Table 4, and funds with greater capitals, in reality, are considered to be more 
stable since they usually have higher probabilities of meeting their capital requirement in 
economic downturns. Another finding consistent with Gupta and Liang (2005) is that age 
has a statistically significant negative correlation with its Cap ratio in Model 2. The 
negative correlation may be explained by the fact that it is difficult for new funds to 
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Table 5: Cross-sectional regression of Cap ratios on fund characteristics 
 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 1.470*** 0.313 1.576** 1.975*** 1.871*** 
 
(0.007) (0.665) (0.021) (0.004) (0.007) 
Log(size) 0.013 0.018 0.010 0.016 0.015 
 
(0.464) (0.433) (0.621) (0.443) (0.452) 
Log(age) -0.040 -0.141* -0.027 -0.071 -0.083 
 
(0.710) (0.302) (0.819) (0.554) (0.489) 
Management fee 0.0670 0.151*** -0.064 
 
-0.049 
 
(0.128) (0.058) (0.371) 
 
(0.494) 
Incentive fee 
 
0.017 0.011 
 
0.017*** 
  
(0.009) (0.095) 
 
(0.020) 
Leverage ratio 
 
0.102*** -0.068 -0.057 -0.061 
  
(0.139) (0.294) (0.378) (0.348) 
Watermark dummy 
 
-0.247** 
 
-0.163* -0.236 
  
(0.039) 
 
(0.089) (0.021) 
Lock up (months) 
 
-0.013** 
 
-0.004 -0.003 
  
(0.040) 
 
(0.511) (0.553) 
Convertible arb 
  
-0.645* -0.681* -0.655* 
   
(0.076) (0.061) (0.071) 
Emerging markets 
  
-0.848* -0.890*** -0.894*** 
   
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market neutral 
  
-0.426*** -0.417 -0.442** 
   
(0.228) (0.240) (0.212) 
Event driven 
  
-0.619 -0.588** -0.625** 
   
(0.027) (0.036) (0.025) 
Fixed income arb 
  
-0.696** -0.676* -0.713** 
   
(0.044) (0.051) (0.040) 
Fund of funds 
  
-0.199** -0.394 -0.238 
   
(0.432) (0.112) (0.353) 
Global macro 
  
-0.623 -0.680* -0.649*** 
   
(0.088) (0.066) (0.076) 
Long/short 
  
-0.372* -0.365 -0.386 
   
(0.134) (0.142) (0.119) 
Managed futures 
  
1.114 1.066** 1.072** 
   
(0.013) (0.034) (0.033) 
Multi-strategy 
  
0.628** 0.573* 0.594** 
   
(0.032) (0.051) (0.042) 
Option-strategy 
  
-1.342** -1.283 -1.32 
   
(0.144) (0.164) (0.150) 
Adj R-square (%) 0.29 4.48 30.96 31.05 31.83 
 
 22 
Table 6: Undercapitalization based on VaR assuming normal distributions 
 
Style Live funds   Dead funds 
 
Total funds No. U-cap % U cap Cap ratio 
 
Total funds No. U-cap % U cap Cap ratio 
        Mean Median         Mean Median 
Convertible arbitrage 27 1 3.7 3.1 3.0 
 
81 0 0.0 8.8 6.5 
Dedicated short bias 3 0 0.0 2.8 2.8 
 
23 1 4.3 2.2 1.7 
Emerging markets 138 4 2.9 2.2 1.1 
 
165 3 1.8 6.1 5.5 
Market neutral 62 0 0.0 6.4 6.1 
 
116 0 0.0 5.8 5.1 
Event driven 106 0 0.0 4.7 4.0 
 
220 0 0.0 6.2 4.6 
Fixed income arbitrage 54 0 0.0 19.4 16.0 
 
106 0 0.0 2.0 1.2 
Fund of funds 1122 2 0.2 8.5 6.5 
 
1277 1 0.1 2.9 2.1 
Global macro 81 2 2.5 6.0 2.7 
 
110 0 0.0 9.4 5.8 
Long/short equity hedge 574 2 0.3 2.9 2.3 
 
785 17 2.2 7.6 5.2 
Managed futures 174 1 0.6 5.0 2.1 
 
242 5 2.1 2.3 1.4 
Multi-strategy 340 0 0.0 16.1 12.0 
 
220 0 0.0 1.2 0.8 
Option-strategy 1 0 0.0 2.3 2.3 
 
13 1 7.7 6.5 4.1 
Other 65 1 1.5 7.7 4.6 
 
36 0 0.0 4.5 5.6 
            Total 2747 13 0.5 8.3 5.4   3394 28 0.8 4.7 3.4 
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survive when they first come into market, so fund managers of younger funds tend to be 
more cautious than those dealing with older funds. This conservative attitude of investing 
would usually lead to a high level of Cap ratio during younger stage of a fund’s life. The 
last three models capture the relationship between the Cap ratio and investment styles. As 
we can see from Table 5, among all the styles, only managed futures and multi-strategy 
funds have positive relationships with Cap ratios, and other styles tend to be negatively 
correlated with Cap ratios. The insight is that hedge funds adopting these two styles seem 
to be better capitalized than others. 
We then calculate the values of Cap ratios calculated assuming the returns of 
hedge funds follow normal distributions. Table 6 demonstrates the results. The reason for 
constructing this table is to determine whether it is necessary to use the EVT approach as 
a base for our VaR calculation. The EVT approach is much more complicated than the 
normal distribution method; if we could confirm the assumption of normal distribution is 
reasonable with our data, we would use the normal distribution approach instead. Under 
the assumption of normal distribution, VaR is simply calculated as -2.58 multiplied by 
the standard deviation of the fund. We compare the results from Table 3 with those in 
Table 6, and check whether the assumption makes a difference in our assessment. The 
number (percentage) of undercapitalized funds measured with the method of EVT is 222 
(8.1%) for live funds, while the number (percentage) of undercapitalized live funds 
assuming normality is only 13 (0.5%). We can get a similar result for the dead funds. 
These results are consistent with Gupta and Liang (2005); the normality assumption 
dramatically underestimates the level of undercapitalization for both live and dead funds. 
The reason behind the underestimation is that we ignore the fat tails that actually exist by 
assuming normality in the return of the hedge funds. However, lower returns are located 
in the left tails. Therefore we actually ignore some of the lower returns if we calculate the 
Cap ratio by assuming normality. At the same time the competitive feature of EVT 
method is that it covers all the extreme situations. In conclusion, if we evaluate whether a 
hedge fund is capitalized by assuming the historical returns exhibit a normal distribution, 
we would underestimate the amount of capital cushions required for extreme events and 
face financial risk in the long run. Another widely used parameter for risk analysis is 
leverage ratio. However, based on the results in Table 4, there is no significant difference 
 24 
in leverage ratios between capitalized and undercapitalized funds for dead funds, 
indicating that leverage ratio is neither a better measurement of hedge funds’ risk than 
VaR.
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7: Robustness test 
7.1 Tail conditional loss and 99.94% VaR 
As mentioned above, the required capital is calculated as three times the one-
month 99% VaR. Now we examine whether it is safe to use three as a multiplier. Firstly, 
we calculate the value of TCL using formula (5), and then calculate the ratio of TCL to 
the corresponding 99% VaR. Results organized by fund investment style are shown in 
Table 7. The ratios for live funds are around one for all styles, and slightly greater than 
one for dead funds. None of the style has a TCL/VaR ratio over three. We also report the 
ratio of 99.94% VaR to 99% VaR to support our conclusion. The mean and median ratios 
are 2.24 and 1.19 for live funds, and 1.25 and 1.16 for dead funds. Again, similar to 
Gupta and Liang (2005), none of the mean or median ratio is over three among all the 
thirteen investment styles. We conclude that the expected losses are very unlikely to 
exceed three times the VaR even under extreme circumstances. Therefore we think that 
three is a safe multiplier and it is logical to follow the recommendation of the Basel 
committee with a multiplier of three for calculating VaR. 
7.2 The effectiveness of using VaR to measure risks 
Though we have employed VaR as a method to measure the risk profiles of all the 
live and dead hedge funds and have reached some conclusions from the analysis, we also 
need to check whether VaR provides an effective measure of risk and capital adequacy 
for the hedge funds. As we mentioned already, a commonly used financial parameter to 
detect risk is standard deviation. Since the returns of hedge funds also have option-like 
non-Gaussian features and it is only valid under the assumption of normality, using 
standard deviation as a measure of risk in this case would significantly underestimate the 
risks hedge fund actually take. Leverage ratio does not convey any valuable information 
is this case either since there is no significant relationship between the adequately 
capitalized and undercapitalized funds.
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Table 7: Tail conditional loss and 99.94% VaR ratio 
Style Live funds   Dead funds 
 
No. TCL/VaR 
 
99.4%/99% VaR 
 
No. TCL/VaR 
 
99.4%/99% VaR 
    Mean Median   Mean Median     Mean Median   Mean Median 
Convertible arbitrage 27 1.040 1.035 
 
2.090 1.147 
 
81 1.054 1.035 
 
1.264 1.190 
Dedicated short bias 3 1.040 1.037 
 
2.360 1.211 
 
23 1.046 1.036 
 
1.182 1.148 
Emerging markets 138 1.031 1.024 
 
2.183 1.162 
 
165 1.034 1.023 
 
1.227 1.174 
Market neutral 62 0.170 1.062 
 
2.830 2.866 
 
116 1.049 1.033 
 
1.384 1.186 
Event driven 106 0.964 1.042 
 
1.540 1.126 
 
220 1.073 1.045 
 
1.292 1.143 
Fixed income arbitrage 54 1.052 1.034 
 
1.560 2.599 
 
106 1.039 1.032 
 
1.205 1.173 
Fund of funds 1122 1.051 1.049 
 
1.264 1.205 
 
1277 1.044 1.036 
 
1.151 1.131 
Global macro 81 1.049 1.036 
 
1.180 1.145 
 
110 1.036 1.022 
 
1.435 1.179 
Long/short equity hedge 574 1.042 1.031 
 
2.610 1.207 
 
785 1.045 1.037 
 
1.496 1.195 
Managed futures 174 1.065 1.049 
 
1.471 1.159 
 
242 1.041 1.034 
 
1.251 1.126 
Multi-strategy 340 1.053 1.042 
 
1.671 1.195 
 
220 1.037 1.034 
 
1.164 1.084 
Option-strategy 1 1.027 1.027 
 
1.101 1.101 
 
13 1.044 1.043 
 
1.312 1.319 
Other 65 1.014 1.014 
 
1.282 1.282 
 
36 1.042 1.041 
 
1.195 1.154 
              Total 2747 0.842 1.033   2.240 1.192   3394 1.042 1.032   1.250 1.163 
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In order to prove that VaR is an effective measure of hedge funds’ risk, we check 
if it is able to capture the changes of risk in the hedge funds’ recorded performance 
history. Hedge funds should present higher risk when it gets close to the end of its live 
span, therefore we predict that dead hedge funds should exhibit higher VaRs as they 
approach dead dates and such pattern should not occur with live funds. 
Data we use here are funds with a return history of more than nine years. Instead 
of using a rolling window of five year as Gupta and Liang (2005) did, we assign each 
window a length of seven years to make sure our data covers recent economic downturns 
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. For live funds, the last window, which is also the most 
recent one, includes fund returns from September 2007 to September 2014. Since we set 
a one-year interval between consecutive windows, the second window covers the period 
from September 2006 to September 2013, and the first window starts from September 
2005 and ends in September 2012. For dead funds, the end date of the last window is the 
death date, the end date of the second window is one year before the death date, and the 
end date of the first window is two years before the death date. In order to detect the 
changes in VaR for each fund during these three windows, only funds with at least nine 
years of historical returns are selected. This step will also help eliminate estimation errors 
by making sure each fund that we compare in the sample dataset exists in all three 
windows. 
As we know from formula (3), VaR is a multiplication of negative R99% and 
total assets. For the three consecutive rolling windows we employ here, there are not any 
significant changes in assets between any two consecutive windows. Therefore we 
compare R99% calculated for each window for simplicity. We denote the value of R99% 
from the third window over R99% from the second window for a dead fund as DEAD32. 
DEAD21, LIVE32, and LIVE21 are defined in a similar manner. We present these ratios 
accordingly with boxplots in Figure 1. 1848 live funds and 1962 dead funds with at least 
a nine-year return history are used. Each boxplot in Figure 1 demonstrates the 25
th
, 50
th
 
and 75
th
 quantile of the estimated ratio distribution, as well as upper and lower extreme 
values.  
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Figure 1: Ratios of Successive Rolling Window VaRs 
 
As we can see from the graph, the medians of the VaR ratios are 0.9979, 0.9954, 
0.9956 and 0.9963 from left to the right. Dead funds have a larger variation in VaR ratios 
than live funds. To reach further conclusions, we will first focus on the difference 
between DEAD21 and DEAD32. DEAD 32 has a higher median than DEAD21 and it  
also has a wider range of quantile values. DEAD32 seems like an integral stretching of 
DEAD21. It is reasonable to see it in this way because the VaR ratios for DEAD32 are 
calculated by comparing the VaR values of the third window to those of the second 
window. Since the third rolling window is closer to the death date of a dead fund, it is 
reasonable to find the third rolling window with a higher VaR value. Therefore, DEAD32 
is greater the DEAD21. Although the median values of these two graphs are both close to 
one, VaR value can still capture the risk of hedge funds effectively by presenting a higher 
consecutive VaR ratio and a wider range of ratio volatility. A risk boost that presents in 
the dead funds is not seen in the live funds because there should not be any huge 
increases in their VaR values if the funds stay alive. Therefore we can conclude that VaR 
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is an effective measure that reflects and captures the risk profiles of hedge funds, and it is 
reasonable to use it for determining the capital adequacy of hedge funds. 
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8: Time-series variation in capital adequacy 
The results in Table 2, Table 3 and corresponding analysis can only explain the 
static features about the capital adequacy of hedge funds as of September 2014. Due to 
constant portfolio changes in hedge funds and frequent fluctuations in financial market, it 
is intuitive to extend our research to dynamic risk profile of hedge funds.  
To obtain a visualized impression on whether the hedge funds have enough 
capital throughout recent financial history, we compute Cap ratios using hedge fund 
returns over a rolling window of 84 months (a seven-year period) for 120 times. By doing 
this, we hope to capture the capital adequacy of hedge funds from a dynamic perspective. 
We already know how to calculate the Cap ratio for any hedge fund with a complete 
return history as of September 2014, and now we apply the same method to 120 datasets. 
We define each sub-dataset to be 84 months and set an interval of one month between 
any two consecutive sub-datasets. To be specific, the last window in our analysis is from 
September 2007 to September 2014. By moving back one month at a time for 120 times, 
we obtain 120 rolling windows with the first window starting in September 2004.  
The first graph in Figure 2 shows changes in the degree of undercapitalization for 
live funds monthly from September 2004 to September 2014. As we can see from the 
graph, the percentage of undercapitalized decreases from 24.08% in September 2004 to a 
minimum of 12.39% in November 2008, and then it increases to 22.82% in December 
2009 and decreases smoothly to 15.32% in September 2014. In particular, the fraction of 
undercapitalization declines quite quickly during the financial crisis of 2007 to 2008. 
This happens since those funds that did not survive the crisis were removed from live 
fund database and funds that survived tend to be better capitalized. In other words, this 
relatively low fraction of undercapitalization is because it only takes the hedge funds that 
survived the crisis into consideration. Although the percentage of undercapitalized live 
funds fluctuates a lot over the past ten years, there is not a monotonic trend that Gupta 
and Liang (2005) find in their paper.  
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The historical fluctuation pictures a trend in the capital adequacy of the live hedge 
funds and also reflects the reaction of hedge funds’ capital reserve to the constant 
changes in the financial market. A relative high ratio of undercapitalization may illustrate 
an unstable financial market situation since most of the live hedge funds stay deficient in 
capital during the corresponding period of time; however, a low undercapitalization 
percentage does not necessarily reflect stable market situations. For example, the 
undercapitalization rate of live hedge funds reaches its minimum of 12.39% in November 
2008 as a result of the crisis as we mentioned before.  
Figure 2: Historical rolling window capitalization 
 
The second graph in Figure 2 demonstrates the trend of the median Cap ratio for 
live funds from September 2004 to September 2014. We can get a coincidental 
conclusion from graph 2 as we get from the first graph of Fig. 1. The median Cap ratio 
decreases gradually from 0.71 in September 2004 to 0.35 in February 2010, followed by 
a sharp increase to 0.88 in November 2010 and a consecutive decreasing till September 
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2014. Gupata and Liang (2005) find that the median Cap ratio from January 1995 to 
January 2003 fluctuates around 2.5, whereas the median Cap ratio in the past ten years 
has been around 0.5. Therefore the extent of adequately capitalization for live funds has 
reduced over the years. Overall, we get a basic understanding of the dynamic variation in 
capital adequacy of live hedge funds from Figure 2. 
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9: Conclusion 
In this paper, we conduct researches on evaluating the risk profiles and capital 
adequacy of hedge funds. 2747 live funds and 3394 dead funds from Lipper Tass 
Academic Hedge Fund Data are used during our analysis.  
We use Cap ratios to determine whether hedge funds are adequately capitalized. 
As of September 2014, 8.1% of live funds and 12.3% of dead funds are undercapitalized. 
Although live funds are better capitalized than dead funds in general, capital deficiency is 
not necessarily the most important reason for hedge fund death since over 85% of dead 
funds are adequately capitalized right before their death date. That being said, holding 
enough capital is essential for hedge funds to survive in the long run.  
We conduct further analysis on differences in fund characteristics between 
capitalized and under capitalized hedge funds and examine how Cap ratios vary 
according to these characteristics by conducting cross-sectional regression. The result 
implies that younger hedge funds tend to be more capitalized since they are managed 
more carefully; however, fund size is not statistically correlated with Cap ratios. We also 
find a relationship between investment styles and Cap ratios. Till our assessment time, 
managed futures and multi-strategy are better capitalized and consequently have lower 
probabilities of default than other styles.  
We evaluate whether VaR-based measures are appropriate for assessing hedge 
fund risk and prove that traditional measures, such as standard deviation and leverage 
ratio, tend to introduce errors in the process and underestimate the risks that hedge funds 
take. To analyze the effectiveness of VaR method, we draw boxplots of ratios for 
successive rolling window VaRs and reach the conclusion that VaR can reflect the risk 
changes of hedge funds efficaciously. VaR-based measures also capture risks of hedge 
funds dynamically. 
In this paper, we grasp an understanding of the risk characteristics and capital 
adequacy of hedge funds. It is meaningful for the hedge fund managers and researchers to 
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conduct further evaluation on hedge fund risk profile and its relationship with various 
factors. An accurate generalization and forecasts will contribute to the operational 
efficiency of the hedge funds industry. 
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Appendix A 
Figure 2: Rolling percentage of undercapitalized live funds 
  
This code is used to organize assets of each fund that are used in Figure 2. The first row 
represents fund number, followed by historical asset of each fund along the column. 
Returns of each fund are also organized in a similar way.  
 
clc 
clear all 
close all 
format compact 
warning off all 
 
% Load raw data 
[num,~,~] = xlsread('ProductPerformance'); 
prodRef = num(:,1); 
assets = num(:,5); 
[grps] = grpstats(assets,prodRef,{'gname'}); 
  
grps = str2double(grps); 
A = table(prodRef,assets,'VariableNames',{'ProductReference' 'Assets'}); 
  
[num2,txt2,raw2] = xlsread('ProductDetails'); 
B = table(num2(:,1),num2(:,51),'VariableNames',{'ProductReference' 'Length'}); 
  
C = join(A,B);  % Ref Assets Length 
  
D = C(C.Length>2555,:);   % Delete funds less than 7 years 
  
% Organize assets based on Reference 
[num1,~,~] = xlsread('table2part1'); 
data(1,:) = (num1(:,1)).'; 
Fundref = data(1,:); 
Fundassets = table2array(D(:,2)); 
Find = table2array(D(:,1)); 
  
for i = Fundref 
    [row,col] = find(Find == i); 
         j = find(Fundref == i); 
         data(2:numel(row)+1,j) = Fundassets(row,1);  
         % Data save as Table2b2(vertical)(1) 
end 
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Appendix B 
Figure 2: Rolling percentage of undercapitalized live funds 
 
clc 
clear all 
close all 
format compact 
warning off all 
 
% Load raw data 
data = xlsread('Table2b2(vertical)');        % Returns(>7yrs) 
assets = xlsread('Table2b2(vertical)(1)');  % Assets(>7yrs) 
 
% Pre-allocate space 
time = nan(1,120); 
R = nan(size(data,2),120); 
required = nan(size(data,2),120); 
cap = nan(size(data,2),120); 
underornot = nan(size(data,2),120); 
under = nan(1,120); 
notunder = nan(1,120); 
total = nan(1,120); 
percent = nan(1,120); 
  
% Loop to calculate the percentage of undercapitalized live funds in each window  
tailProb = 0.01; 
p = 0.01; 
for x = 1:size(data,2) 
    flipped = flip(data(2:end,x)); 
    [r,c] = find(flipped~=0); 
    flipped2 = flipped(r(1):end); 
    data2 = flip(flipped2); 
     
    for y = 1:120 
        try 
% Find asset of each fund at the end of each rolling window 
            window = data2((end-83-(y-1)):(end-(y-1))); 
            endposition = length(data2)-(y-1); 
            endasset = assets(endposition+1,x); 
             
            mret = mean(window); 
            adjustret = -1*(window-mret); 
            u = quantile(adjustret,1-tailProb); 
            tailRet = u-adjustret(adjustret<u); 
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% Estimate parameters – tail index and sigma 
            pparams = gpfit(tailRet); 
            tailIndex = pparams(1,1); 
            sigma = pparams(1,2); 
 
% Calculate R & var 
            N = numel(window); 
            n = numel(tailRet); 
            if tailIndex == 0 
                R(x,y) = u + sigma*log(n/N*p); 
            else 
                R(x,y) = u + sigma/tailIndex*((N/n*p)^(-tailIndex)-1); 
            end 
             
            time(1,y) = 735873 - 30*(y-1); 
             
required(x,y) = R(x,y)*endasset/100*3; 
            cap(x,y) = (endasset-required(x,y))./required(x,y); 
  
            if cap(x,y) < 0 
                underornot(x,y) = 1; 
            else 
                underornot(x,y) = 0; 
            end 
             
            under(1,y) = numel(find(underornot(:,y)==1)); 
            notunder(1,y) = numel(find(underornot(:,y)==0)); 
            total(1,y) = under(1,y) + notunder(1,y); 
            percent(1,y) = under(1,y)./total(1,y); 
             
        catch exception 
            warning('Not enough returns.'); 
            continue 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
% Organize results  
result = [time;percent]; 
for i = 1:120 
    if result(2,i)==0 
        result(:,i) = []; 
    end 
end 
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% Plot Figure 2 
plot(time,percent); 
datetick('x',28) 
title('Rolling Percentage of Undercapitalized Live Funds'); 
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